Match Quality, Contractual Sorting and Wage Cyclicality

We examine whether match-specific quality has any effect on the type of contractual arrangements and on wage dynamics.

With
João Alfredo Galindo da Fonseca and Yaniv Yedid-Levi

Abstract
This paper studies the role of match quality for contractual arrangements, wage dynamics and workers’ retention. We develop a model in which profit maximizing firms offer a performance-based pay arrangement to retain workers with relatively high match-specific productivity. The key implications of our model hold in data from the NLSY79, where information about job histories and performance pay is available. We relate our findings to the literature on occupation heterogeneity and provide evidence that jobs in “cognitive” occupations have better match quality, exhibit higher prevalence of performance pay, display significant sensitivity of wages to business cycle conditions and last longer.

DRAFT (PDF)

Citation

@techreport{fgy2017contracts,
  title={Match Quality, Contractual Sorting and Wage Cyclicality},
  author={Galindo da Fonseca, Joao and Gallipoli, Giovanni and Yedid-Levi, Yaniv},
  year={2017},
  note = {Working Paper},
  institution={UBC, Vancouver School of Economics}
}